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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Comt of Appeals issued its decision in this matter on July 21, 2016. 
See Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2016 UT App 154,380 P.3d 3. This Comt 
has jurisdiction to review the decision of the court of appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78A-3-102(3)(a) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1. Whether the court of appeals ened in concluding the standard 
stated in Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, ,r27, 171 P.3d 442, and White 
v. Deeselhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994), for summary judgment should be 
read as permitting judgment solely on the ground that reasonable minds could not 
find in favor of the plaintiff in negligence cases in which the standard of care is not 
fixed by law. 
Issue No. 1 - Standard of Review. On ce1tiorari, the comt reviews the decision 
of the court of appeals, not that of the district court. Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 
67, ,r 10, 225 P.3d 874. Further, the court reviews the comt of appeals's decision 
regarding summary judgment for correctness, "giving no deference to its 
conclusions oflaw." State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ,r 8,240 P.3d 780. See also State 
v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ,r 8, 147 P.3d 1176 ("On certiorari, the Utah Supreme 
Court reviews the decision of the comt of appeals for correctness and examines 
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whether the court of appeals applied the appropriate standard of review in assessing 
the district court's decision.") 
Summary judgment 1ulings are reviewed for correctness. See Aurora Credit 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). See also 
Penunuri, 2016 UT App 154, ~ 15 ("An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." ( quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 6, 177 
P.3d 600)). 
Issue No. 2. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
determination that reasonable minds must conclude that there was no gross 
negligence under the circumstances. 
Issue No. 2 - Standard of Review. On a writ of certiorari, the court reviews 
the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court, and applies the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals. See Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, 
P.C., 2016 UT 7, i-111, 367 P.3d 1006. See also Overstock.com, Inc. v. 
SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, ~ 12, 192 P.3d 858 ("Summary judgment is 
appropriate when ... 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.") 
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Issue No. 3. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court' s 
award of deposition costs to Respondent. 
Issue No. 3 - Standard of Review. Utah appellate courts review a district 
court's decision to award the prevailing party costs under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Young v. State, 2000 UT 91 , ,r 4, 16 P.3d 549. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Appellants' Addendum A.) 
Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Appellants' Addendum B.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. On August 1, 2007, Plaintiff/ Appellant Lisa Penunuri 
and two friends took part in a horseback ride operated by Defendant/ Appellee Rocky 
Mountain Outfitters in and around the Sundance Resort. Prior to embarking on the 
ride, Penunuri was presented with a Horseback Riding Release. Among other things, 
the Release explained that horseback riding involves ce1iain "inherent risks," 
including but not limited to "the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may 
result in injury ... to persons on or around them" and "the unpredictability of the 
animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as .. . unfamiliar objects, persons, or 
other animals." Penunuri briefly scanned and signed the Release. During the ride, 
Penunuri fell from her horse and was injured. Penunuri alleges that she fell when 
her horse accelerated unexpectedly. 
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Joined by her husband, Barry Siegwart, Penunuri filed suit against the Rocky 
Mountain Outfitters and various Sundance related entities ( collectively 
"Defendants") asserting claims for both ordinary and gross negligence. The district 
court dismissed Penunuri' s ordinary negligence claims based on indemnification 
provisions found in the Release. Penunuri appealed. A panel of the court of appeals 
affirmed the district court's decision on interlocutory appeal. Penunuri petitioned 
for writ of certiorari. The petition was granted, but the decision of the court of 
appeals was also affirmed. 
After the case was returned to the district comi, Defendants moved for 
summary judgment on Penunuri' s only remaining claim - gross negligence. 
Defendants filed two motions requesting summary judgment on multiple and 
independent bases. Defendants' first motion focused on the argument that 
reasonable minds could not find Defendants grossly negligent based on the 
undisputed facts of the case, and that Penunuri could not establish causation without 
relying on impermissible speculation. Defendants' second motion argued that 
summary judgment should be granted because Penunuri 's expe1i was not qualified 
to render opinion testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to 
commercial trail guiding and that, without such testimony, Penunuri would be 
unable to satisfy her burden of proof at trial. The district comi granted both of 
Defendants' motions and Penunuri appealed. 
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Focusing on the district court's ruling on Defendants ' first motion, the court 
of appeals affirmed. In particular, the court found that "even resolving all inferences 
in [Penunuri's] favor, the evidence could not support a finding of gross negligence." 
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners Ltd., 2016 UT App 154, ,-r 28. Having affirmed the 
district court's ruling on the first motion, the court of appeals found it unnecessary 
to address Penunuri's challenge to the district court's ruling on Defendants' second 
motion. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri and her husband filed this 
lawsuit on January 3, 2008. (R. 14.) On March 30, 2010, the district court dismissed 
all of the Penunuri's ordinary negligence-based claims with prejudice and on the 
merits, finding that she had executed a valid and enforceable pre-injury release 
barring her from pursuing those claims. (R. 24 7.) Penunuri was granted permission 
to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the district court's decision. (R. 271.) On June 
9, 2011 , the Utah Court of Appeals issued a written decision affirming the district 
court's ruling. See Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011 UT App 183, 257 
P.3d 1049. Penunuri petitioned for certiorari review. This Court granted the 
petition, but affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, finding the pre-injury 
release valid and enforceable. See Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 
22, ,-r 8, 301 P.3d 984. 
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Following remand, on September 9, 2014, the district court granted two 
motions for summary judgment by the Defendants and dismissed Penunuri ' s claim 
for gross negligence - her only remaining cause of action. (R. 1557.) Penunuri 
appealed. (R. 1569.) 
C. Disposition of the Court. On July 21, 2016, the court of appeals issued a 
unanimous decision affirming the district court's ruling. See Penunuri, 2016 UT 
App 154. On November 1, 2016, this Court granted a petition by Penunuri for writ 
of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On August 1, 2007, Lisa Penunuri and two friends , Barbara Black and 
Suzanne Moag, participated in a horseback trail ride at the Sundance Resort located 
in Provo Canyon. (R. 1555,, 1.) 
2. The trail ride at Sundance was operated by Defendant Rocky Mountain 
Outfitters ("RMO"). Ashley Wright guided the ride for Plaintiff, her two friends, 
and two others, Kate Fort and her daughter, Haley. (R. 1555, ,r 3.) 
3. Before embarking on the trail ride, Penunuri and the other participants 
received a Horseback Riding Release which, among other things, warned of the risks 
involved in horseback riding. In pertinent part, the Release states: 
I, the undersigned, .. . understand that horseback riding, sleigh 
riding or horse drawn wagons ( collectively "Horseback riding") 
involve SIGNIFICANT RISK OF SERIOUS PERSONAL 
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INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR EVEN DEATH. The 
risks include NATURAL, MAN-MADE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONDITIONS AND INHERENT RISKS , including changing 
weather, mud, rocks, variations in steepness, terrain, natural and 
man-made obstacles, equipment failure and the negligence of 
others. "Inherent risk" with regard to equine or livestock 
activities means those dangers or conditions which are an 
integral part of equine or livestock activities, which may include: 
(a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result 
in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them; (b) the 
unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation 
such as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, 
persons, or other animals; ( c) collisions with other animals or 
objects; or ( d) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent 
manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, 
such as failing to maintain control over the animal or not acting 
within his or her ability. 
(R. 1554, ,r 6.) 
4. In addition to the warnings listed in the Horseback Riding Release, two 
signs were posted at Sundance, one in the building where guests sign the Horseback 
Riding Release and the other near the horse arena; both signs provide further 
warnings to participants of the inherent risks associated with horseback riding. (R. 
1553, il 8.) 
5. After the group finished filling out paperwork, they gathered outside 
near the horses. Penunuri's friend, Suzanne Moag, recalls RMO's guide, Ashley, 
giving general instructions during that time. Suzanne testified: 
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Q. During that time do you recall what instructions or anything 
that was given before the group set out on the ride? 
A. I believe Ashley told Lisa [Penunuri] and Haley gave, them 
some instructions. Barb and I just asked about the temperament 
of the horses and the names of them. 
Q. What kind of instructions do you recall Ashley giving Lisa 
[Penunuri] and Haley? 
A. Just about mounting the horse, and I remember when we 
started out, the horses, Haley's horse and Lisa's horse kept 
eating. 
Q. Grazing? 
A. Yes; and it was very difficult for Haley to keep the horse's 
head up. 
Q. Do you recall any instructions given by Ashley discouraging 
them from letting the horse's graze? 
A. Yes. I remember Ashley saying "pull up," "pull up." And 
Haley was very small and she was not strong enough to keep 
yanking the horse's head up. 
Q. Any instructions about, you know, using the reins, doing this 
will make the horse go left or right or anything like that? 
A. Oh, I'm sure, but I can't recall it. I don't listen to that. 
(R. 1553-52, ~ 9; R. 408, S. Moag Dep., pp. 19-20.) 
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6. Ashley, the RMO guide, led the group and was in front during the entire 
ride. As the group headed out from the Sundance stables, Haley, Kate and Penunuri 
were the first three riders, with Barbara and Susan in the back. (R. 1552, ,r 11; R. 
418, A. Wright Dep., p. 38.) 
7. About 45 minutes into the ride, the group came to the Stewart Falls 
Meadow. At that point the order of the riders changed, with Barbara and Suzanne 
directly behind Ashley, followed by Kate Fort, her daughter Haley, and Penunuri. 
(R. 1552, ,r 12; R. 418, A. Wright Dep., p. 40.) 
8. After departing from the Stewart Falls Meadow, Penunuri and Haley 
struggled to keep their horses from grazing, which in turn caused their horses to lag 
behind slightly. Penunuri testified that, at that point, she was "still trying to get the 
hang of the horse grazing." (R. 1552-51, ,r 13; R. 426, L. Penunuri Dep., p. 138.) 
9. Ms. Fort testified that during the ride RMO's guide, Ashley, instructed 
the riders, "Pull up on the reins. Don't let them eat." (R. 1551, ,r 14.) 
10. In an effort to keep the group together, Ashley testified that she had 
been "slowing down the whole ride." (R. 1550, ,r 16.) 
11. When that did not work because of Haley being unable to keep her 
horse from grazing, Ashley informed the group that they would be stopping at a 
clearing in about 100 feet so she could go back and take the lead rope of Haley's 
horse and pony it the rest of the way. (R. 1550, ,r 17.) 
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12. As Ashley was turning around to pony Haley ' s horse, Penunuri fell off 
the back of her horse. (R. 1550, ,r 18; R. 419, A. Wright Dep., p. 21.) 
13 . Regarding her fall from the horse, Penunuri testified: 
Q .... Why don't you describe what you remember about the 
fall? 
A. Okay. I remember being on the horse, and we were beginning 
the climb, and then Haley's horse grazed - - stopped to graze. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then her - - I guess - - you know, my horse was stopped 
behind hers, and my horse started going, and it was - - it was a 
rougher ride than I remember having had before, other than, you 
know, with other grazing episodes my horse would, you know, 
kind of giddyup a little faster than it had been going, because 
Haley's horse would start up and then mine would start up, too, 
and then would slow down. And this particular incident, it 
seemed even rougher than, you know, the giddyup that I had 
gotten in other stops. And then I don't remember anything until 
I was on the ground. 
(R. 1550, ,r 19; R. 429, L. Penunuri Dep., pp. 114-115.) 
14. After filing suit and during the course of discovery, Penunuri 
designated Scott Earl as an expert witness regarding horse behavior and the dangers 
associated with riding horses. (R. 1549, ,r 21; R. 467.) 
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15. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that there is no evidence in this 
case indicating that RMO's guide, Ashley, exercised no care or acted in willful 
disregard for the care of others. Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. Is there anything that you've seen in the facts of this case, as 
you understand it, that would indicate that Ashley Wright acted 
with no care at all? 
A. No. 
(R. 1549, ,r 23; R. 456, S. Earl Dep., pp. 71-72.) Mr. Earl further testified: 
Q. Is there anything that you see in the record that indicates that 
Ashley acted intentionally or - -
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. - - in willful disregard for the care - -
A. No. 
Q. Is there anything in the report that would indicate to you that 
she acted with no care? 
A. No. 
(R. 1549, ,r 23; R. 454, S. Earl Dep., p. 87.) 
16. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that he does not know what 
caused Penunuri's horse to accelerate, but gave several possible reasons. He stated: 
A. There's several factors that could have - - or, in my opinion, 
several things that could have startled that horse and caused it to 
11 
start running, going around a blind curve, not seeing the other 
horses at the time, being a distance, wanting to catch up. I'm not 
even saying it was startled. 
Q. Just may have wanted to catch up? 
A. Yes, and they will accelerate to catch up. 
(R. 1548, ~ 24; R. 462, S. Earl Dep., p. 61.) 
1 7. Mr. Earl has testified that there is no way to predict when a horse might 
accelerate. During his deposition, Mr. Earl stated: 
A. . . . Quick acceleration. 
Q. Is there any way to predict that? 
A. There's no way to predict any of it. It's an animal. You can 
minimize the risk by doing certain things. 
Q. But there's always that inherent risk with an animal, you 
don't know what they're going to do? 
A. That's right. 
(R. 1548, ~ 24; R. 461, S. Earl Dep., p. 14.) He further testified: 
Q. Is it possible that [Penunuri] fell off the horse, m your 
opinion, because - - I mean, is it possible that Lisa [Penunuri] 
could have prevented the horse from trotting? 
A. If she knew what she was doing, yes. 
Q. She could have, like she did many times on the ride, and not 
fall off the horse when it accelerated? 
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A. It' s always possible when a horse accelerates, in my 
experience, and many times when a horse accelerates, it's usually 
unexpected, and the most experienced riders can come awfully 
close to falling off. 
Q. That's just one of the inherent risks of riding a horse? 
A. That's part of it. When a horse accelerates, you better be 
ready. 
(R. 1548-47, ~ 25; R. 455, S. Earl Dep., 74-75.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A plaintiff asserting a claim of gross negligence bears the heavy burden of 
showing a complete lack of care on the part of the defendant and must demonstrate 
"carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the 
consequences that may result." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 709 P.2d 330,335 (Utah 1985). Here, Penunuri has failed to show any effor in 
the court of appeals's affirmance of the district court's decision granting summary 
judgment and dismissing her claim for gross negligence as a matter of law. She 
argues that unless the standard of care is "fixed by law," summary judgment is 
automatically barred. Yet, recent precedent makes it clear that is not true and that 
summary judgment can be granted on claims of gross negligence if "reasonable 
minds" cannot differ. 
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Based on the undisputed facts of this case, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to Penunuri, "reasonable minds" cannot differ in finding that Defendants ' 
conduct simply does not meet the requisite elements for gross negligence under Utah 
law. As such, the court of appeals correctly affirmed summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants. Further, because the district court found that certain depositions were 
used in a meaningful way by Defendants in obtaining summary judgment, the court 
of appeals correctly found no abuse of discretion by the district court in awarding 
Defendants costs for those depositions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Summary Judgment Can Appropriately Be Granted On A 
Claim Of Gross Negligence, Even When The Standard Of Care Is 
Not "Fixed By Law." 
The principal issue presented in this case is whether the court of appeals 
correctly affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of 
Penunuri' s gross negligence claim without the standard of care being "fixed by law." 
Admittedly, as a general rule, negligence is a question of fact for the jury to decide. 
See Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). But this rule is not without 
exception. In clear-cut cases, even ordinary negligence claims cannot withstand 
summary judgment. See Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 
1991). And the same is true for claims of alleged gross negligence. See Blaisdell v. 
Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc., 2012 UT 37, ,r 15,284 P.3d 616; see also Moon Lake 
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Electric Ass 'n, Inc. v. Ultrasystems W Const., Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Specifically, where "reasonable minds" could not differ as to whether 
the defendant's conduct was grossly negligent, summary judgment is appropriate. 
See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37, ,I,I 14-17. 
Penunuri broadly asserts that unless the applicable standard of care is "fixed 
by law," gross negligence cannot be resolved on summary judgment. In support of 
her position, she relies almost exclusively on the following excerpt from Berry v. 
Greater Park City Co. , 2007 UT 87, ,I 27, 171 P.3d 442, which states: 
[S]ummary judgment is generally inappropriate unless the applicable 
standard of care is fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but 
one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the 
circumstances. 
Id. ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 1 Because the standard of care 
applicable to commercial horseback trail guiding is not "fixed by law," Penunuri 
argues that summary judgment should not have been granted. (See Appellants' Br., 
pp. 16-17.) She contends that Berry's use of the term "and" in the above quote 
means that summary judgment can only be granted when there is both a standard of 
care "fixed by law" and a determination that "reasonable minds" cannot differ in 
finding the defendant was not grossly negligent. 
1 This pronouncement can also be found in the case White v. Deeselhorst, 879 P .2d 13 71 , 
1374 (Utah 1994) and, as discussed below, originates from the same line of appellate 
authorities. 
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For several reasons, Penunuri 's interpretation of Berry misses the mark. First 
and foremost, Penunuri fails to recognize that her position runs counter to the recent 
case of Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc., 2012 UT 37, 284 P.3d 616, in 
which summary judgment was affirmed in dismissing a claim of gross negligence, 
despite there being no standard of care fixed by law. 
In Blaisdell, the plaintiff, Mark H. Blaisdell ("Blaisdell"), a dentist, purchased 
dental practice management software from Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc. 
("Dentrix"). In 2006, Dentrix sent a software upgrade to Blaisdell. Id. at ,r 3. One 
of Blaisdell' s employees installed the new software while on the phone with a 
Dentrix technical support employee. Id. During an unsuccessful installation attempt, 
the software overwrote and erased all of Blaisdell's patient data. Id. Blaisdell filed 
suit against Dentrix alleging, among other things, gross negligence. Id. at ,r 14.2 The 
district court dismissed the claim and Blaisdell appealed. Id. 
Like Penunuri, Blaisdell argued on appeal that under Berry, summary 
judgment simply could not be granted if the standard of care is not "fixed by law." 
See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37, ,r 14 (quoting Berry, 2007 UT 87, ~ 30.) Rejecting this 
2 In her brief, Penunuri curiously argues that Blaisdell "did not make a claim for gross 
negligence" (see Appellants' Br., p. 18, n. 23) and erroneously asserts that the Blaisdell 
court applied "a different rule" which holds that "if a Plaintiff does not have facts to 
establish ordinary negligence then the plaintiff would not have the facts to establish gross 
negligence." (See id., p. 17.) A review of the Blaisdell decision demonstrates that, on both 
counts, Penunuri is wrong. 
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argument, the court found that gross negligence could not be found because the 
undisputed facts showed the defendant had exercised care by warning the plaintiff 
to back up his data prior to installing the software upgrade. Id. at ,I15. Based on 
this, the court affirmed summary judgment, stating that "[i]t cannot be reasonably 
asserted that Dentrix 'show[ ed] utter indifference' to the possibility that the 
[s.oftware] upgrade could erase the data." Id. at ,I 17.3 
In this case, the court of appeals below concluded that Blaisdell represented 
"the original and best reading" of Berry. 2016 UT App 154, ,I 21. But its analysis 
did not stop there. Reviewing Berry, the court of appeals traced the "fixed by law" 
3 Blaisdell is not the first Utah appellate decision to affirm summary judgment on a claim 
of gross negligence. In Moon Lake Electric Ass 'n, Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the plaintiff, a rural electric 
cooperative, solicited bids for the construction of an electrical substation. Each bidder was 
required to furnish a bid bond. Id. at 126. After being awarded the bid, the defendant 
contractor discovered a calculation error. Id. The plaintiff awarded the contract to another 
bidder and sought the forfeiture of the defendant' s bond. Id. When the defendant refused 
to surrender the bond, the plaintiff sued. Id. The defendant successfully moved for 
summary judgment. Id. Affirming the district court's decision, the court of appeals found 
that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence of gross negligence. The court explained: 
The basis for [plaintiff] Moon Lake's negligence claim is that [ defendant] 
Ultrasystems failed to have an individual familiar with welding review the 
bid solicitation. The standard, however, is gross negligence .. .. The trial 
court could reasonably determine, even considering the facts in a light most 
favorable to Moon Lake, that Ultrasystems's actions did not rise beyond the 
level of ordinary negligence. 
767 P.2d at 129 (emphasis in original). 
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standard to the case Elmer v. Vanderford, 445 P.2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968), which 
came to Utah via Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah , 780 P,2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). See Penunuri, 2016 UT App 154, ~ 21. Elmer, as noted by the court of 
appeals, supports a disjunctive application of the "fixed by law" formulation. See 
id. ( explaining that the Elmer court "identifie[ d] 'two classes of cases in which the 
question of negligence may be determined by the court as a conclusion of law., In 
the first class of cases, 'the standard of duty is fixed, and the measure of duty defined, 
by law, and is the same under all circumstances.' In the second, 'the facts are 
undisputed and but one reasonable inference can be drawn from them"') Id. at~ 21 
( citations omitted). 
While not included in the court of appeals's analysis, Wycalis itself also 
supports a disjunctive application of the "fixed by law" fmmulation. In explaining 
the summary judgment standard, the Wycalis court stated: 
summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of 
care is 'fixed by law,' Elmer v. Vanderford, 74 Wash.2d 546,445 P.2d 
612, 614 (1968); see also Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 
424 P.2d 6, 10 (Okla. 1967), and reasonable minds could reach but one 
conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances. 
See Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 
431 P.2d 126, 129 (1967); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
780 P.2d at 825. This passage reveals that the court used the term "and" simply to 
create a compound sentence to explain the "fixed by law" standard on the one hand, 
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and the "reasonable minds" standard on the other. It was not intended to create a 
new singular condition or prerequisite to summary judgment. 
A. Applying a rigid "fixed by law" standard will undercut 
the utility of Rule 56 and frustrate the ability of parties to 
allocate risk through legally enforceable contracts. 
Ordinary negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care. See Williams 
v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). See also Meese v. Brigham Young 
University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981) ("Negligence is the failure to do what a 
reasonable and prudent person would have done under the circumstances, or doing 
what such person under such circumstances would not have done."). Because 
ordinary negligence requires a determination as to what is reasonable under the 
circumstances, it is no wonder that summary judgment is generally inappropriate 
except in the most clear-cut cases. See Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P .2d 182, 
183 (Utah 1991). 
Unlike ordinary negligence, gross negligence is not tied to the same 
amorphous standard. In Utah, "the task confronting a plaintiff who claims injury 
due to a defendant's gross negligence is markedly greater than that of a plaintiff who 
traces his injury to ordinary negligence." Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 
87, ,r 26, 171 P.3d 442. Gross negligence is "the failure to observe even slight care; 
it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the 
consequences that may result." Id. ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 
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accord Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P .2d 330, 335 
(Utah 1985). "While negligence generally connotes the failure to observe due care, 
gross negligence and recklessness are 'the failure to observe even slight care.'" 
Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, ~ 44,235 P.3d 730 (emphasis added) 
( additional citations omitted). See also Model Utah Jury Instruction (MUJI) 
CV202B (2d. ed.) ("Gross negligence means a failure to observe even slight care; it 
is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter difference to the 
consequences."). 4 
With gross negligence having defined and determinable features, it is 
axiomatic that when the undisputed facts are such that "reasonable minds" cannot 
find those features met, summary judgment is appropriate. This is the essence of the 
Rule 56 standard. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56 ("The court shall grant summary judgment 
if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.").5 Yet, under Penunuri's 
position, summary judgment would be unattainable in any case of alleged gross 
4 There appears to be no disagreement between the parties over the basic definition of 
"gross negligence." (See Appellants ' Br., p. 20, stating "Gross negligence is the failure to 
observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter 
indifference to the consequences that may result."). 
5 The court of appeals below noted that the class of cases described in Elmer where 
summary judgment may appropriately be granted because only "one reasonable inference 
can be drawn from them" (i.e., the "reasonable minds" standard) was "an alternative 
formulation of our rule 56." See Penunuri, 2016 UT App 154, ,i 21. 
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negligence, so long as the standard of care is not "fixed by law." If adopted, such a 
rule would deprive litigants and the courts of what has been described as a "valuable 
and necessary tool" in our judicial system. See Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 824 ("Summary 
disposition of lawsuits is a valuable and necessary tool in a judicial system such as 
ours, which strives for the efficient and timely resolution of legal disputes. Granting 
summary judgment saves the parties and the com1s the time and expense of a full-
blown trial."); Kerr v. City a/Salt Lake, 2013 UT 45, ,r 30,322 P.3d 669 (explaining 
that the purpose of summary judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense 
of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, 
he would not be entitled to prevail"); Reagan Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 
P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) ("A major purpose of summary judgment is to avoid 
unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue to present to the finder of fact.") . 
Penunuri' s application of the "fixed by law" standard would also weaken the 
ability of parties to contractually allocate risk. While recognizing that pre-injury 
releases do not protect against claims of gross negligence, see Milne v. USA Cycling, 
Inc., 575 F.3d 1120, 1130 (10th Cir. 2009), Utah courts have repeatedly upheld the 
use of pre-injury releases in dismissing claims of ordinary negligence. See Pearce 
v. Utah Athletic Found. , 179 P.3d 760 (Utah 2008). See also Berry v. Greater Park 
City Co., 2007 UT 87, ,r12, 1 71 P .3d 442 (recognizing the "general principle of 
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common law" that "those who are not engaged in public service may properly 
bargain against liability for haim caused by their ordinary negligence in performance 
of contractual duty."). 
Indeed, in a prior related appeal, this Court upheld the dismissal of Penunuri ' s 
ordinary negligence claim based on the pre-injury release she signed prior to 
embarking on the trail ride. See Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 22, 
301 P.3d 984. In rejecting Penunuri ' s assertion that the pre-injury release violated 
public policy, the court stated: 
It is well settled that pre-mJury releases of claims for ordinary 
negligence can be valid and enforceable. Indeed, '[w]e have joined the 
majority of jurisdictions in permitting people to surrender their rights 
to recover in tort for negligence of others.' 
Id. at ,r 25 . 
For the recreation industry, the importance of pre-injury releases cannot be 
understated. See G. Johnson, Enforceability of Exculpatory Clauses in Hazardous 
Recreational Activities, 11 Utah Bar J. 8, 11 (1998) ("If Utah' s hazardous 
recreational industries are to remain viable, Utah's framework for analyzing and 
enforcing exculpatory clauses should be consistently followed . ... "). See also Gore 
v. Tri-County Raceway, Inc., 407 F.Supp 489 (D. Ala. 1974) ("If these [pre-injury 
releases], voluntarily entered into, were not upheld, the effect would be to increase 
the liability of those organizing or sponsoring such events to such an extent that no 
one would be willing to undertake to sponsor a sporting event. Clearly, this would 
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not be in the public interest."). However, under Penunuri's application of Berry, the 
expected protections afforded by these releases would be easily sidestepped. An 
injured party having executed a valid and enforceable pre-injury release could 
largely avoid the consequences of that agreement and assure themselves a trial 
simply by filing suit and asserting a baseless claim for gross negligence. No matter 
how factually unsupported or unsustainable, if the standard of care is not "fixed by 
law," then any claim of gross negligence would be impervious to summary 
judgment. Under such application, an allegation of gross negligence could be played 
as a "trump card" to prevent summary disposition and all but guarantee that the 
matter be litigated through trial. Such abuse, if not already afoot, should not be 
allowed. 
II. Based On The Undisputed Facts Of This Case, "Reasonable 
Minds" Could Not Find Defendants Grossly Negligent. 
Penunuri has failed to present any facts upon which "reasonable minds" could 
find Defendants grossly negligent. While previously set forth, Utah's definition of 
gross negligence warrants repeating. "Gross negligence is the failure to observe 
even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter 
indifference to the consequences that may result." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). 
"Recklessness is subsumed in [Utah' s] definition of gross negligence." Daniels v. 
Gamma West Brachytherapy, 2009 UT 66, ~ 43, 221 P.3d 256. "Recklessness 
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includes conduct where 'the actor kn[ ew], or ha[ d] reason to know, . . . of facts which 
create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately proceeds 
to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk."' Id. 
at~ 42 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 500 cmt. a (1965)). 
"While negligence generally connotes the failure to observe due care, gross 
negligence and recklessness are the failure to observe even slight care." Bingham v. 
Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, ~ 44, 235 P.3d 730 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "[T]o carry a claim of gross negligence, [plaintiffs] are required to show 
conduct that not only demonstrates 'an unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
another' but also that 'such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary 
to make his conduct negligent." Milne v. USA Cycling, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 
1287-88 (D. Utah 2007) (emphasis in original). See also Doe v. Doe, 878 P.2d 1161, 
1163 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that recklessness requires that there be a 
"strong probability" that harm may result). 
In Orthopedic & Sports Injury Clinic v. Wang Laboratories, 922 F.2d 220, 
224 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991), a case approvingly cited by the court in Blaisdell, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that gross negligence is "more than just simple 
inadvertence." Rather, it "is treated in many respects as if hmm was intended" and 
the actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in 
reckless disregard of the risk known to him, or so obvious that he must 
be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly 
probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a 
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conscious indifference to consequences, amounting almost to a 
willingness that harm should follow. 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
In this case, Penunuri argues that the lower courts e1Ted and that reasonable 
jurors could find gross negligence, claiming that Defendants' guide did not properly 
control the size of the gaps between the riders. (See Appellants' Br., p. 23.) To 
deflect from the undisputed facts which the district court and court of appeals found 
determinative, Penunuri offers a muddled, exaggerated and even misleading review 
of the record. She claims that Defendants' guide, Ashley, allowed gaps to form 
between the riders and "ignored the pleas of other guest riders who were begging 
[her] to stop and let the trailing riders catch up .... " (Appellants' Br., 21.) 
(Emphasis added.) She also claims that "but for" the gaps, Penunuri' s horse would 
not have "suddenly accelerated and cause[] her to be thrown off the horse." (Id.) 
(Emphasis added.) Nothing in the record supports these assertions. 
First, the district court found it undisputed that the gaps formed when 
Penunuri and the rider in front of her, Haley, struggled to keep their horses from 
grazing after the group departed from the Stewart Falls Meadow. (R. 1552, ,r 13.) 
This, in tum, caused their horses to lag behind slightly. (See id.) Ashley instructed 
the riders to "Pull up on the reins. Don't let them eat." (R. 1551, ,r 14.) And, in an 
effort to keep the group together, she "slow[ed] down the whole ride." (R. 1550, ,r 
16.) When that did not work, Ashley informed the group that they would be stopping 
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at a clearing in about 100 feet so she could go back and take the lead rope of Haley's 
horse and pony it the rest of the way. (R. 1550, ~ 17.) This would clear the narrow 
trail and allow her to ride back to Haley. Penunuri' s claim that Ashley allowed gaps 
and "ignored" pleas by others to let them catch up is simply incorrect and 
unsupported. 
Second, Penunuri cannot say that the gaps were the "but for" cause of the 
horse's acceleration; it is undisputed no one knows what caused her horse to 
accelerate.6 And the claim that she was "thrown from the horse," Plaintiffs own 
sworn testimony shows that is not true. In describing her fall , Penunuri testified: 
Okay. I remember being on the horse, and we were beginning the 
climb, and then Haley's horse grazed - - stopped to graze. 
* * * 
And then her - - I guess - - you know, my horse was stopped behind 
hers, and my horse started going, and it was - - it was a rougher ride 
than I remember having had before, other than, you know, with other 
grazing episodes my horse would, you know, kind of giddyup a little 
faster than it had been going, because Haley's horse would start up and 
then mine would start up, too, and then would show down. And this 
pmiicular incident, it seemed even rougher than, you know, the giddyup 
6 While not part of the court of appeals's decision, Penunuri's theory that gaps between the 
horses "caused" her horse to accelerate unexpectedly was rejected by the district court as 
too speculative to survive summary judgment. (R. 1413-12.) The district court noted that 
Penunuri's own purported expert had testified that there were several factors that could 
have caused the horse to accelerate, including a number of recognized "inherent risks." 
(Id.) At one point, Penunuri herself even when went so far as to exclaim "[i]t is not relevant 
what caused [the] horse to accelerate when it came around the bend. In fact there were 
probably multiple causes to what lead to the acceleration," urging instead that it was 
Defendants' guide who caused her to fall for not preventing the horse from accelerating. 
(R. 1260.) 
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that I had gotten in other stops. And then I don't remember anything 
until I was on the ground. 
(R. 1550, ~ 19; R. 429, L. Penunuri Dep., pp. 114-115.) 
The court of appeals observed that, even resolving all inferences in Penunuri' s 
favor, the undisputed facts could not sustain a jury's finding of gross negligence. 
See Penunuri, 2016 UT App 154, ~ 28. Significant to the court of appeals was that 
Penunuri' s own proposed expert had "testified that there is no evidence in this case 
indicating that [Defendants'] guide ... exercised no care or acted in willful disregard 
for the care of others." Id. Also significant was the fact that Defendants' guide had 
given instructions during the ride, had been "slowing down the whole ride" to keep 
the riders together, and was preparing to take the reins of Haley's uncooperative 
horse once the riders had reached a suitable area to rearrange the order of the rider. 
See id. 
These are just some of the undisputed facts the court of appeals found 
decisive. Others include Defendants ' express waining to Penunuri, through both a 
written Horseback Riding Release and through posted signage, that horses may act 
unpredictably. (See R. 1554-53, ~~ 6, 8.) These warnings specifically advised 
Penunuri of the "unpredictability of the animal's reaction to ... unfamiliar objects, 
persons or other animals." (See id.) Another is Defendants' provision of an 
experienced guide who led Penunuri' s group and assisted them throughout the 
duration of the ride. Defendants did not simply leave Penunuri to roam through the 
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forest on horseback by herself. Another is Defendants ' guide ' s specific instructions 
to the riders on how to keep the horses from stopping to graze. (See R. 1553-52, ,r,r 
9-10.) Another is Penunuri's own purported expert's testimony that it was 
appropriate for the guide to attempt to go back and pony the uncooperative horse in 
an effort to keep the group together. (See R. 460, S. Earl Dep., pp. 27-28 .) 
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, Penunuri simply cannot show "utter 
indifference" on the part of the Defendants. As the district court determined: 
.. . even Mr. Earl [Penunuri' s own expert] has testified that he was 
aware of no evidence in this case showing that Ashley Wright exercised 
no care or acted with willful disregard. The undisputed facts establish 
that Ashley Wright, among other things, lead Plaintiff Penunuri and 
other guests during the trail ride, that she attempted to slow down the 
ride to keep the riders closer together, and (when that did not work 
because Haley's horse had stopped to graze) gathered the other riders 
in a clearing to make room for her to go back and take the lead rope of 
Haley's uncooperative horse to pony it the rest of the way. Based on 
the undisputed facts of this case, the Court finds it cannot be reasonable 
[sic] asserted that Defendants "showed utter indifference." See 
Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37, ifl 7 (finding that summary judgment on a claim 
of gross negligence was appropriately granted where the undisputed 
facts established that the plaintiff would be unable to show the 
defendant acted with utter indifference). 
(R. 1547-1546.) While announcing her ruling orally to the parties, the district court 
also noted that there was no evidence upon which Defendants' guide could be found 
to have acted recklessly. The court stated: 
[Ashley] was attempting to get the group to a larger clearing, an open 
area where she could get the group back together, and then she was 
actually going to pony - - which from what I read means to go back, she 
was going to go back to Hailey's horse and guide Hailey's horse for her 
28 
by taking the reins and pulling the horse along with her so that the horse 
would quit grazing. I don't find anything in the undisputed facts which 
persuades me that Ashley, and thereby the other defendants, failed to 
observe even slight care. I don't find that under the definition of 
recklessness from Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, is the full 
title, that she knew or had reason to know of fact which created a high 
degree of risk of physical harm, and that she deliberately proceeded to 
act or failed to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk. 
(R. 1576, p. 7.) 
Without question, this Court's decision in Blaisdell provided important 
guidance and direction to the district court and the comi of appeals in analyzing 
Penunuri's gross negligence claim and determining that it could not survive 
summary judgment. See Penunuri, 2016 UT App 154, ,r 23. But this is not to say 
that the determination of the lower courts was somehow unique or extraordinary. 7 
7 Rather than accepting Blaisdell as a clarification of Berry, amicus curiae, the Utah 
Association for Justice (UAJ), attempts to dismiss it as an aberration. (See Amicus Brf., p. 
8) ("Blaisdell represents the rare case where undisputed facts show the plaintiff cannot 
prove gross negligence no matter the standard of care advocated by the plaintiff." 
(Emphasis added)). Also, in urging for the reversal of the court of appeals's decision, the 
UAJ boldly asserts, "Plaintiff and Defendant will be required to put on expert testimony so 
the jury can determine what [the standard of care] is. The jury will then need to assess 
whether defendants' deviation from the standard of care amounts to gross negligence." 
(Id., p. 10.) The UAJ's statement demonstrates a lack of understanding concerning the facts 
and procedural history of this case. As previously indicated, Defendants were granted 
summary judgment on multiple bases. While not included with the issues on which this 
Court granted certiorari, the district court also granted Defendants summary judgment on 
the basis that Penunuri' s proposed expert, Scott Earl, lacked the qualifications necessary 
to render opinion testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to commercial 
horseback trail guiding. (R. 1539.) Significant to the district court was Mr. Earl's admitted 
unfamiliarity with the industry standards applicable to the trail guiding business and his 
lack of commercial horseback riding experience. (See id. at R. 1540-1539.) With Mr. Earl 
having been excluded by the district court, even under UAJ position, summary judgment 
was properly granted. See e.g., De Adder v. lntermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 
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In Rutecki v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 2007 WL 192514, * 1, unpublished, ajf'd 290 
Fed. Appx. 537, the plaintiff, Heather Rutecki ("Rutecki"), made reservations to go 
horseback riding at The Greenbrier Resort ("Greenbrier") in West Virginia. Rutecki 
was taken on a private ride with a guide from Greenbrier, even though she had 
wanted a group ride because she said she "would feel safe." Id. The guide, Mr. Diem, 
selected a horse for Rutecki. Id. Prior to the ride, Rutecki went inside the office and 
executed a "Notice, Release and Indemnification" form, after which she went back 
outside and mounted her horse. Id. Shortly after beginning the trail portion of the 
ride, Mr. Diem's horse "Thunder" balked at something it either saw or thought it 
saw, and then went up a bank and turned suddenly. Id. Mr. Diem was unable to 
control his horse, lost his balance, and was forced to jump clear of the animal. 
Rutecki's horse, apparently disturbed by Thunder's reaction, turned quickly and ran, 
causing her to fall and severely injure her back. Id. 
Rutecki filed a lawsuit against Greenbrier alleging, among other things, gross 
negligence. Id. at *2. Greenbrier moved for summary judgment. In granting 
Greenbrier' s motion, the court noted that Rutecki had put forth no evidence that 
Greenbrier was grossly negligent or that its gross negligence was the proximate 
173, ,i 25 ( affirming summary judgment based on the plaintiffs failure to designate an 
expert qualified to render admissible opinion testimony concerning the standard of care); 
Callister v. Snowbird Corp., 2014 UT App 243, 337 P.3d 1044 (affirming summary 
judgment because the plaintiff had failed to designate an expert witness to present evidence 
concerning the applicable standard of care). 
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cause of her injuries . Id. at * 10. The court explained that the question was whether 
there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Greenbrier had "acted with an absence of slight diligence or scant care and with an 
utter disregard for prudence, amounting to complete neglect for Plaintiff's safety." 
Id. at * 10. Ultimately, the court found that Rutecki had failed to produce any 
evidence that what Mr. Diem did during her trail ride constituted gross negligence. 
See id. 8 
8 While perhaps not germane to the issues on appeal, it should be noted that the Rutecki 
court, like the district court here, found no admissible evidence establishing that the 
defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. In its order 
granting summary judgment, the district court below explained: 
Utah law recognizes that horseback riding involves "inherent risks" that are 
an integral part of equine activities. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201. These 
risks include, among other things, 'the unpredictability of the animal's 
reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds, sudden movement, and 
unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals. ' See id. (emphasis added). 
Because [Penunuri] has not, without engaging in impermissible speculation, 
presented any evidence establishing that Defendants' conduct was the 
proximate cause of the horse's unexpected acceleration, as opposed to the 
various ' inherent risks' associated with horseback riding, [Penunuri's] claim 
fails as a matter of law. 
(R. 1545.) (Emphasis in original.) (Citations omitted.) Similarly, in Rutecki, the court 
found the plaintiffs evidence concerning proximate cause lacking. The court stated: 
What is apparent when one reviews this case is that no one seems to know 
what caused these horses to behave in such an aberrant fashion. Proximate 
cause in West Virginia is defined as the 'last negligent act contributing to the 
injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. ' ... 
In this case, even if the Court were to conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence that the Greenbrier was grossly negligent, there is no proof 
whatsoever in the record that Mr. Diem's actions or omissions contributed 
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In sum, there is no evidence upon which reasonable minds could find that 
Defendants or Defendants ' guide "failed to observe even slight care" or were 
"careless[] or reckless[] to a degree that shows utter indifference." Atkin Wright & 
Miles, 709 P.2d at 335. Stated more succinctly, there is no evidence upon which 
reasonable minds could find gross negligence. 
III. The Court Of Appeals Properly Reviewed And Affirmed The 
District Court's Award Of Deposition Costs. 
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "[u]nless a statute, 
these rules, or a court provides otherwise, costs should be allowed to the prevailing 
party." Utah R. Civ. P. 54( d)(l ). Under Utah law, deposition costs may be recovered 
by the prevailing party in accordance with Rule 54( d)(l) if "the trial comt is 
persuaded that [the depositions] were taken in good faith and, in the light of the 
circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the 
case." See Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). 
to Plaintiff's injuries, and would not have occurred absent gross negligence. 
Regardless of what Mr. Diem may or may not have done, the intervening 
event of the inexplicable behavior of the two horses appears to be the cause 
of this accident. Because of [Rutecki' s] failure to provide such evidence, 
reasonable persons would not be able to 'draw different conclusions,' even 
when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to [Rutecki], and 
summary judgment is appropriate on the gross negligence count of 
[Rutecki' s] complaint. 
Id. at * * 10-11 ( emphasis added). 
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In Young v. State, 2000 UT 91 , 16 P.3d 549, the plaintiff argued that the 
district court had abused its discretion by awarding the defendant deposition costs 
which the defendant did not use during the trial. In rejecting this argument, the court 
explained that "[t]o be taxable as costs, depositions need not be used at trial, 
provided other criteria are met." Id. at ,r 7. Referring to its articulation of the 
"general rule" in Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1997), the court stated: 
deposition costs can be recovered if the trial court determines that the 
deposition was essential to the case, either because the deposition was 
used in some meaningful way at trial or because the development of the 
case was of such a complex nature that the information provided by the 
deposition could not have been obtained through less expensive means 
of discovery. The initial requirement, that the deposition be taken in 
good faith , must also be satisfied before the trial court may award 
deposition costs. 
Young, 2000 UT 91, 17 (emphasis added). 
Penunuri argues that the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
award of costs by claiming deposition costs may only be awarded if the district court 
determines that the deposition was essential to the case because (1) the deposition 
was "used in a meaningful way at trial," or (2) "because the development of the case 
was of such a complex nature that the information in the deposition could not be 
obtained through less expensive means of discovery." (Appellants' Br., pp. 30-31.) 
As recognized by the court of appeals, Penunuri did not argue that the district court 
could not analyze whether the depositions were essential under the "used in a 
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meaningful way" prong. Penunuri, 2016 UT App 154, ~ 39, n. 5. However, in her 
brief, Penunuri asserts that the district court and court of appeals both erred because 
the "used in a meaningful way" prong applies only when the depositions are used 
"at trial." (See Appellants' Br., p. 31.) Penunuri's argument attempts to draw false 
distinction. 
Whether used "at trial" or in support of a successful dispositive motion, the 
result is the same. For the prevailing party to be entitled to deposition costs, Utah 
law requires that the district court be persuaded "that [the depositions] were taken in 
good faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the 
development and presentation of the case." Frampton, 605 P.3d at 774. In this case, 
there can be no dispute that the district court determined these requirements were 
met. In its order, the district court expressly found "no evidence that any of the 
[selected] depositions were not taken in good faith." (R. 1506.) 
The court further found that "each of the depositions were used in a 
meaningful way in the Defendants' motions for summary judgment and were 
necessary to development of this complex case" and even described in detail how 
each of the depositions were used by Defendants in the summary judgment motions. 
(R. 1506-05.) The court stated: 
With respect to Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri, her deposition was used to 
establish the facts surrounding the accident and her knowing and 
voluntary asset [sic] to the pre-injury release she signed prior to 
embarking on the horseback trail ride. Regarding Katie Fort and Susan 
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Moag, the Comt finds that their depositions were used meaningfully by 
Defendants to establish that there was no evidence Defendants' guide 
exercised no care or acted with utter indifference toward the safety of 
those on the trail ride. Concerning Scott Earl, the Court finds that his 
deposition was used meaningfully and extensively by Defendants in 
establishing that he was aware of no evidence that would support 
Plaintiffs' gross negligence claim and that he lacked the expe1tise 
necessary to render opinion testimony concerning the standard of care 
applicable to the commercial horseback trail guiding industry. 
(R. 1506-05.) 
The district comt's award of deposition costs and the comt of appeals' 
affirmance of the same was correct and appropriate under Utah law and in no way 
constituted an abuse of discretion. See Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, il 4, 16 P.3d 549. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
,,J 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2017. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By ~ 
H. Burt Ringwood 
A.J. Sano 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees 
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